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The repeal of the Corn Laws in nineteenth century Great Britain represents the classic example of a shift towards specialization for comparative advantage and support of free trade. Most countries, however, have been unable to undertake such policy reversals and have increased protection for their declining agriculture sectors in the process of indus trialization. Japan stands out as a rich industrial state that can not abandon its agricul tural roots even when its small-scale farms require massive government subsidies to survive. Nevertheless, a series of reforms have occurred in the past decade. The rice laws that formed the core of Japanese agricultural protection were repealed in part and replaced with a new support system that is more complementary to existing internation al frameworks.
What explains the ability to achieve reform in sticky areas such as Japanese agri cultural policy? Pressures on Japan to reform its agricultural policies come from sever al sources: political change, economic constraints, public opinion, and international trade negotiations. While all of these sources generate pressure for policy reform, only international trade negotiations bring external monitoring of implementation. External monitoring is essential to reform policy areas with strong vested interests. Therefore, the most substantial change should be expected where reforms represent compliance with international agreements, and less change should be expected in areas where reforms are largely domestic in origin.
This question is important in evaluating the impact of trade agreements on domes tic policy. Increasingly, trade negotiations focus on "behind the border" measures, but
debates about the effectiveness of international trade rules still focus on trade flows and border policies. 1 The purpose of this article is to evaluate whether trade agreements that reach behind the border have achieved substantive reform. Thus, the focus is on the post negotiation phase when states change domestic laws in order to comply with interna tional agreements that reach deeply into existing policy regimes. given to farmers. In the area of liberalization, however, Japan has complied fully with its commitments under the international agreement in terms of changing border protection measures, increasing market access, and reducing the trade distorting form of domestic subsidies. These findings fit with the expectation that reform policies subject to inter national monitoring would be more likely to produce substantive results than those based primarily on domestic pressures.
Explaining Reform in the Presence of Vested Interests
In the market orientation of agricultural policies, a simple breakdown categorizes four kinds of reform in terms of the direction and degree of policy change: increased state intervention in markets, maintenance of the status quo, modification of the level and form of protection, and end of state intervention in markets. Japan's past decade of agri cultural policy reforms represents the third case, as policy instruments were changed and moderate liberalization occurred.3
The agricultural sector of advanced industrial democracies represents a hard case for market-oriented reforms, given the strong demand for protection. As an import-com peting sector with low mobility, political economy theories predict that agricultural interests will be harmed by free trade and favor protection. Theories of collective action suggest that narrow interests with strong incentives will organize effectively to influ ence the political process.4 Once established, domestic institutions will have consider able stickiness that prevents reforms even after changes in the underlying interests.5
Cross-national evidence shows that, as the agricultural sector weakens, it is likely to receive more protection.6 Indeed, the rapid decline of comparative advantage for Japan's agricultural sector during Japan's postwar economic boom led Japan to increase its agri cultural protection at a faster pace and to higher levels than other industrial countries.
Honma calculates that over the period from 1955 to 1987 the nominal rate of protection across major agricultural commodities (a measure of the difference between domestic and border prices) rose from 18 to 151 in Japan, a sharp increase compared to France (rising from 33 to 81) and the United States (rising from 2 to 23).7
The policy context for Japanese agriculture represents a classic example of an iron triangle among interest group, politicians, and bureaucracy. Mulgan comprehensively documents the closed policy community dominated by the centralized producer group
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The fact that politicians on the agriculture committees of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Policy Affairs Research Council outnumber any other policy area is one sign of politicians' concern to serve their farmer constituencies.10 MAFF works closely with Ndkyo and the no-rinzoku, both to preserve the farming sector that justifies the min istry's existence and to maximize its budget and authority. Mulgan describes how the legal foundation of agricultural policy includes an establishment law granting MAFF broad discretionary authority and specific laws and ordinances that provide tools for intervention (for example, requirements for permits).1' Similar patterns of close ties among politicians, bureaucrats, and farm groups are observed in the United States and
Europe.12
The agricultural policy community composed of Nokyo, no-rinzoku, and MAFF has remained autonomous from the demands of outside actors. The formal policy process often includes representatives of other interests, but their recommendations have little influence. For example, Schwartz documents that the rice price council, which included scholars and representatives from consumer, producer, and other social groups, carried little weight in a decision-making process dominated by coordination among Nokyo-, no-rinzoku, and MAFF.13 Expert commissions on economic reform have recommended agricultural restructuring and liberalization to no avail. Likewise, the widely discussed tendency of each ministry to exercise exclusive control within its jurisdiction is readily apparent in agricultural policy. A senior MITI official commented that, since agriculture was a "MAFF area," the trade ministry could not directly pressure MAFF on agricultur al liberalization. 14 MAFF policy autonomy allows the ministry, with the active support and coopera tion of its partners Ndkyo-and no-rinzoku politicians, to reduce the impact of reforms through delayed targets, side payments, and other measures. Thus, reform from above risks being eroded through resistance from below. On the one hand, the senior political leadership holds monitoring mechanisms, such as the threat to pass new statutes with more specific instructions or to intervene in personnel appointments, that limit the degree to which policies deviate from the intention of legislation.15 Yet these threats lack credibility when confronting vested interests closely tied to the electoral fortunes of the party, such as farmers.
International institutions serve a monitoring function that substitutes for weak domestic monitoring. In this case, the WTO offers robust enforcement of commitments Tabellini's insight that international trade rules operate, not only to resolve commitment problems between states, but also to resolve commitment problems between a govern ment and domestic actors. 22 International institutions provide a new policy tool for lead ers who must restrain a policy community that has long received discretion over policy decisions. The external monitoring function prevents backsliding on international com mitments even where domestic credibility problems would be expected to be high due to the strength of domestic opposition. This monitoring produces two observable implica tions. First, although vested interests will delay acceptance of international commit ments, they will not cause compliance failures. Second, policy reforms subject to international monitoring will have greater impact than policy reforms with only domes tic origin.
What Pressures for Reform?
Postwar land reform initiated the predominance of small farmers that continues in Japan today. Inefficient farms make agriculture a small source of revenue for farmers and a small share of production in the economy. Agriculture accounted for 2.7 percent of the Third, the electoral district reform legislation adopted in 1994 replaced multimem ber districts with a mixed system of single member districts and proportional represen tation. The new system was expected to limit the dependence of politicians on appeals to narrow constituency groups such as farmers. However, as noted by Curtis, reduction of district size could also increase the pressure on politicians to devote attention to local The changing demographic characteristics of the agricultural work force also exert inexorable pressure for change. As the farm population declined from over one-third of Japan's population in 1961 to less than ten percent in the 1990s, it became more diffi cult to justify agricultural spending as social integration policies. 36 In 2004, 47 percent of farmers were sixty-five and over, in contrast to only 6 percent of the nonagricultural work force.37 Faced with these demographic trends, MAFF has long advocated the need for structural reforms to encourage part-time and elderly farmers to lease or sell land to young full-time farmers who will cultivate the land at a greater productivity rate. The Uruguay Round Agriculture Agreement (URAA) that went into effect in 1995 pro vides a framework for increasing market access and reducing domestic support subsi dies and export subsidies.
In the URAA, market access commitments follow the principle of tariffication, which requires the conversion of nontariff barriers such as import quotas to more trans parent tariff measures. Even when high tariffs remained, which was true for the sensitive products of many countries, tariffication was seen as the most demanding policy adjust ment that held significance as an enabling reform for future liberalization. 43 The URAA requires a 20 percent reduction in the total Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) for all developed members. The AMS includes subsidies that have a direct effect on pro duction, while excluding those categorized as "green" because of their minimal distor tionary effect on production. The logic behind this distinction is to restrain policies that encourage trade-distorting surplus domestic production such as price supports, but to allow governments to help their farmers through direct income payments and subsidies competitive pressures on domestic producers will make structural adjustment necessary in order to build a core of efficient farmers that can survive with lower levels of protec tion. International pressure does not directly create pressures to reduce budget expendi tures because the limits are on particular kinds of subsidies rather than overall spending.
In contrast, international pressure clearly conflicts with the goal to increase Japan's food self-sufficiency.
Evaluating Reform Outcomes
Thus, four different types of pressure on Japan's agricultural sector-political, econom ic, consumer, and international-can potentially influence agricultural reform. Political, economic, and consumer pressure, which are mostly domestic in origin, have pushed towards structural adjustment and cost reduction and also increased demand for higher is now restricted to purchase for stockpiles, and the Food Agency has been abolished.
Japanese agricultural policies have long served the objective to support farmer incomes. This goal remains unchanged, but there has been a shift in the means of pro viding income support. As discussed above, the 1961 Agricultural Basic Law used price support policies as the central mechanism to improve farmer incomes. The MAFF and LDP coordinated the setting of prices at a level that would provide farmers adequate income. Prices for the main commodities steadily increased, with a few controversial and relatively unsuccessful efforts to restrict the increase during the late 1 980s. After the 1995 law introduced market mechanisms in price setting, the government continued to provide income stabilization through compensation for sharp price reductions. These commodity-specific income stabilization programs are funded by farmer and govern ment contributions in a kind of public insurance program that issues payments when prices fall below the previous three-years' average. The legislation replaces the separate commodity income stabilization programs with a single direct income transfer scheme. 49 The new policy still compensates farmers for price declines, but it will limit payments to farmers engaged in large-scale production.
Producers of major crops must have farm size of four hectares or larger (ten hectares for producers in Hokkaido) or join a shuraku eino (community farm) of twenty hectares or larger to be eligible for this new payment scheme. Given that the average farm size is only 1.67 hectares, most farms will be ineligible for payments. Farmers who do not meet the size requirement will not receive any compensation from the government.50 Since payment amounts are determined by past production and price declines, they do not pro vide incentives to increase production.51
In the area of agricultural trade policy, Japan accepted tariffication for twenty-eight commodities that had been under import quota protection. While Japan insisted upon special treatment for rice, the exception from tariffication was balanced by a minimum access quota that was scheduled to increase from 5 to 8 percent of domestic consump tion. As imports under this arrangement rose even while a domestic surplus grew, the government belatedly recognized that tariffication would bring a slower rate of increase in imports than the special treatment provisions, and in 1998 Japan accepted tariffica tion for rice as well. Across all agricultural tariffs, Japan's new tariff schedule averages 12 percent, which compares favorably with the EU average of 20 although higher than the U.S. average of 6 percent. 52 The tariff structure for the twenty-eight sensitive com modities including rice that were newly converted from quotas to tariffs, however, con sists of such high secondary tariffs that imports beyond the guaranteed minimum access category face prohibitive barriers.53 Finally, with regards to domestic subsidy reduction, for the first year of implementation in 1995 Japan's AMS commitment level was 4.8 tril lion yen, and Japan spent 3.5 trillion yen for AMS support policies.54 Thus, the Uruguay Round agreement acted more as a ceiling to shape the trajectory of future domestic sup port policies than as a severe constraint on Japan's immediate spending allocation.
In short, in the past decade the major laws guiding Japanese agricultural policy have been overhauled. The government has gone from controlling land sales, prices, and retail distribution to acting as a guarantor against sharp income decline. Border protec tion has shifted from import bans and quotas to tariff policies.
The Cost of Protection Policies Due to budget pressures, the percentage of the agriculture-related budget in the total general account budget has steadily declined from Consumers have gained some savings from the reduction of government market intervention and price support. As noted in Table 1 , retail prices for many of the major commodities have declined in the past decade. Rice, as the most protected sector, has maintained high price levels with relatively moderate price fluctuation over the years.
Increased retail prices for milk and beef reflect increased world prices for these products and market volatility caused by mad cow disease. The percentage producer support estimates remained fairly consistent for major prod ucts such as rice, wheat, and sugar, and decreased slightly for soybeans, beef, and milk.
Japanese consumers pay less than in the past for some major products, but the price dif ferential with world prices remains high.
As the previous analysis indicates, economic pressures, in particular Japan's grow ing debt crisis and the ensuing budget pressure, have led to some cost reduction. MAFF's budget declined in absolute as well as relative levels. Consequently, any addi tional funding for new projects will have to come at the expense of existing programs.
Moreover, retail prices have also declined as the government started to shift away from price support policies to income compensation. However, economic pressures have not led to a decline in spending for farmers, and there has been only a small decline in the cost of protection as measured by the percentage PSE levels. Cutting these costs would directly harm farmer incomes, which makes this area of reform the most politically dif Food Self-Sufficiency The New Basic Law established a new policy to set tar gets for raising Japan's self-sufficiency rate, which had fallen from 73 percent in 1965 to 43 percent in 1995. The self-sufficiency rate is calculated in terms of the percentage of Japanese people's daily caloric intake that is derived from domestically produced food. The-decreasing self-sufficiency rate reflects both dietary changes and liberaliza tion. On the one hand, people eat less of the foods such as rice where Japan has high domestic production. On the other hand, imports have replaced domestic production for many foods such as wheat products. Thus, the call to reverse the decline in Japan's self sufficiency rates requires efforts to increase domestic consumption of the former and increase domestic production of the latter, for an overall effect to reduce reliance on imported food. The inclusion of self-sufficiency targets was the result of a compromise by MAFF to win acceptance by Nokyo of land ownership reforms.67 During Diet hear ings, No5kyo's representative called for Japan to pursue 50 percent self-sufficiency, while others countered that Japan could not raise its self-sufficiency while bringing Japan's 33 agricultural policy into conformity with international trade laws regulating agricul ture.68 Despite such objections, the New Basic Law establishes an increase in self-suffi ciency as a major goal of Japanese agricultural policy, and the subsequent plans have set both a general national target and item-by-item targets for all major products. These nonbinding targets are supported by production goals and spending allocation.69
The self-sufficiency target goals have not been met. The target set in the 2000 Basic Plan to achieve 45 percent calorie-based self-sufficiency by the year 2010 was moved back to the year 2015. This delay represents a de facto retreat from the self-sufficiency targeting policy in recognition that Japan struggled to maintain even a 40 percent self sufficiency rate in 2003.70 In part, it reflects the difficulty of changing consumption habits and increasing the cost competitiveness of Japanese producers. Moreover, the efforts to comply with international commitments to trade liberalization limit the use of import barriers to support self-sufficiency. Recent reforms that decouple payments from production along with whatever liberalization measures come from trade negotiations will exert further downward pressure on Japan's self-sufficiency. Thus, it would appear that the strength of the norinzoku politicians and Nokyuto gain a commitment at the pol icy stage has fallen short in the implementation stage.
Liberalization As part of the URAA, Japan accepted tariffication of import quotas and a schedule for reduction of tariffs, as well as restraint on domestic support policies. Japan has fully implemented all of its tariff and subsidy commitments under the URAA.7' It has done so against a backdrop of strong domestic resistance. Mulgan notes that there was an "avalanche of requests for turning the clock back on trade liber alization," including demands to reduce the quantity of minimum access imports.72 MAFF refused these demands as unacceptable reversal of an existing international agreement.
The outcome of reform policies in this area will be measured according to the terms in the URAA: market access (imports as a share of domestic consumption measured by weight) and AMS spending levels. Table 1 shows a range of product categories for com parison of the trends in Japan's import dependency. Import dependency increased sub stantially for fruits, meats, and vegetables, each nearly doubling the level of import dependency from 1990 to 2003. The rate of increase in import dependency for rice is quite high as a result of the Uruguay Round agreement that replaced the import ban with minimum access imports, but import dependence for rice remains low.73 There has been some reduction of import dependency for those products whose import levels have his torically been quite high, such as wheat and sugar. There has been little change in milk products.
The variation across commodity groups reflects both domestic and international factors. The predominance of rice in Japan's agricultural political economy has made it the most difficult to liberalize and kept absolute import levels low. International pres sure on Japan, however, has been greatest from the United States, which has focused on meats, fruits, and rice, where it has substantial export interests.74 Within the aggregate categories, it is interesting to look at beef and citrus, the two commodities that were a duction. By changing the nature of rice support, MAFF was able to ensure that contin ued subsidies would be classified as "green policies" that are not restricted by the URAA. 75 The change in Japan's rice policy clearly dominates its AMS notification, and there was a smaller 14 percent reduction of AMS spending when excluding rice.76 Figure 1 shows that Japan has performed at a comparable level with the EU and exceed ed the United States in its reduction of AMS spending. 77 In sum, the reforms undertaken by Japan have allowed the steady increase in the nation's import dependency for key commodities. Not even rice has been excluded from this trend. The change in Japan's rice policy in 1998 also conformed with the direction of subsidy constraints in the URAA because it ended government price setting and helped to restrain excess production. While one can reasonably point to this change as simply moving payments from one category to another, such reorientation is exactly the purpose set forth in the URAA. The pattern of outcomes in terms of imports and subsi dies has responded to the direction of international pressure, while there has been less change in the areas that are not subject to such pressure.
Conclusion
The variation in success across different reform areas can be explained by the nature of underlying pressure for reform. Table 2 summarizes the findings. Overall, Japan has not made a dramatic policy reversal in any of the four areas of reform. In terms of the four category scale of reforms, Japan's reforms have not increased protection (the past tra jectory), while maintaining the status quo or changing the form and level of instruments depending upon the area of policy reform. The two areas with moderate changes are structural adjustment and trade liberalization. For structural adjustment the increase in crop diversification and reduction in the number of part-time farmers represent a shift towards more efficient farming, although the lagging results in land reform slow progress. For trade liberalization there have been major changes in the form of protec tion, as import bans and quotas were replaced with tariffs and access guarantees and overall import levels continue to increase. High tariffs, however, limit the gains for sen sitive products. The shift away from price support intervention to income support inter Table 2 International pressure provides external monitoring that enforces compliance so that legal changes produce observable economic outcomes. The goals to reduce Japan's dependency on food imports and liberalize its trade policy were contradictory, but both self-sufficiency targets and market access commitments were included in Japan's agri cultural policy reforms. The demand for greater self-sufficiency was supported by agri cultural interest groups, politicians, and consumers. Yet, unless Japan reneged on its URAA commitments, there was little possibility to reduce dependence on food imports.
Without any enforcement measures or binding constraints, the self-sufficiency targets were easily set aside. In contrast, the import access guarantees and AMS commitments from the Uruguay Round agreement were scrupulously followed. Even strict budget constraints have had little effect on producer compensation. Reforms have changed the way expenditures are allocated in order to reduce their distortionary production effects but not to reduce the total amount paid to farmers. Budget cuts have come from other areas of MAFF spending.
Although Japan has taken steps towards market reforms relative to the past, it still lags behind from an international perspective. Future reforms will come as a result of international trade negotiations, rather than from domestic pressures such as demand for cheaper imported goods or from declining political influence of farmers. Although Japan's agricultural reforms are unlikely to move beyond what will be achieved in the context of trade negotiations, at the same time Japan can be expected to implement faithfully the international agreements it signs. Japan's record of agricultural reform points to the potential for international agreements to overcome resistance from strong vested interests to bring substantive reform outcomes.
NOTES

